Abstract. A common requirement for modern distributed and reactive systems is a high dependability guaranteeing reliability and security. The rigorous analysis of dependable systems speci cations is of paramount importance for the reliability and security of these systems. A two-layered modal speci cation notation will allow the speci cation of services and protocols for distributed dependable systems and their properties. Renement and its dual abstraction will play the key roles in an integrated development and analysis framework. Re nement and abstraction form the basis for an interference analysis method for security properties and for automated test case generation.
Motivation
Current software engineering approaches are unlikely to deliver the level of dependability required to construct future distributed, decentralised, and reactive systems such as mobile systems, telecommunications management, communication and process control, or integrated e-business systems. The recent advent of Internet and other intercommunications technologies has made one aspect of properties particularly important: security properties.
We present a notation for the rigorous development and analysis of dependable systems properties. The speci cation of distributed systems is usually concerned with properties such as reliability or fairness of the communication. In dependable systems with high security requirements other properties are also important. Con dentiality describes that no con dential data is disclosed to unauthorised users. Integrity addresses unauthorised modi cation. Authentication describes that the identity of participants in a communication can be established. We h a ve dependable systems such as public key infrastructures PKI in mind. PKIs are a combination of distributed systems and security technologies, which create an ideal setting to discuss reliability and security issues.
A PKI provides an infrastructure for the management of public keys in cryptographic systems 1 . It deals with entities, protocols and services in those systems. This includes for example services such as the generation, distribution and storage of keys and other secrets. The central concept is that of a certi cate. A certi cate is a datastructure that associates an identity to a public key by means of a signature. This concept is used for encryption, signatures and key exchange. The objectives are to guarantee con dentiality, i n tegrity and authentication.
We will analyse some aspects of PKIs, addressing services and protocols based on these services. We will analyse these services and protocols with respect to security issues such as con dentiality, i n tegrity, and authentication. The security analysis is realised as an interference analysis, i.e., it is checked if an intruder can interfere with the system and violate any of the security conditions. The re nement calculus 2, 3 forms the framework for the analysis. The analysis is supported by systematic test case generation based on abstraction abstraction is dual to re nement.
Modal logics, such as temporal or dynamic logics 4, 5 , have shown their ability to de ne and reason about important properties of dependable systems, such as safety and liveness, through special modal operators 6, 7, 8 . Dynamic logic is suitable for the speci cation of nite aspects, which includes security considerations. Dynamic logic is compositional, i.e., reasoning via structural induction on commands is possible. We will argue that dynamic logic is a suitable tool for security aspects in reactive and distributed systems speci cation. In combination with a re nement concept it allows the analysis of dependable systems in a novel way. Another advantage of dynamic logic is that it embraces the classical pre postcondition technique 9 , which has become the foundation of various engineering methods and notations such as design-by-contract 10 o r the Object Constraint Language OCL 11 .
We propose re nement of modal speci cations as the central concept for the analysis of dependable systems. The re nement relation can be used to develop systems starting from a simple core, but also to integrate an adversary into the speci cation in order to detect possible security aws in a system specication. Re nement essentially guarantees property preservation. Assuming that a property P holds for some speci cation of a system S, i.e., PS, we expect a re ned speci cation S 0 to preserve that property, i.e., PS PS 0 . Re nement is a classical software engineering technique 2, 3 developed to support transformational design and implementation, that has recently been deployed in de ning essential concepts for component technology 12, 1 3 and also for interference analysis 14, 1 5 . Here, we will show a n o vel use of re nement a s a n analysis tool for detecting undesirable interferences and security violations. The re nement-based approach allows us to combine the traditional transformational development with the unusual applications of interference analyses and test case generation for the context of dependable systems.
We i n troduce our speci cation notation in Section 2. In subsections 2.3 and 2.4 we demonstrate the notation by specifying a protocol implementing an authentication service. The principles of re nement and abstraction are introduced in Section 3. An analysis looking at an authentication service is carried out in Section 4 for the protocol described in Section 2.3. Another form of analysis is addressed in Section 5 focussing on con dentiality and integrity i n a k ey establishment and distribution service. We nish with related work and conclusions.
The Notation
The actors in communicating distributed systems are agents. Their activities are usually described in terms of the following application-speci c basic commands: generate and remember data, establish and close connections, send and receive messages, and guards to protect the execution of operations 1 . In this section, we introduce the notation that we will use to specify and reason about dependability properties. A command language can be based on the constructs listed above. However, we will reduce this language for the sake of simplicity here.
The Command and Speci cation Languages
We de ne the command primitives send, receive and a test-operator and the command combinators informally, but we will give axiomatisations later on. This process of con guring the language contributes to a better understanding of the application and its problems. Flexibility in de ning basic variations even on this level is important for the analysis of security protocols.
snd A!R M 1 ; : : : ; M n : the send operation for agent A. R is the receiver, the M i denote messages that are sent. The M i are local variables of the agent. Their value sM i in the current state s is sent t o R. The operation fails if there is no variable M i de ned or no communication takes place. rcv BS M 1 ; : : : ; M n : the receive operation for agent B. S is sender and the M i are messages arriving from S. The reception will only be carried out, if data has been sent. The message data is assigned to local variables M i .
?: the test is an operator that involves a quanti er-free formula . The semantics is to proceed if is true, and fail otherwise.
We assume that messages are created and assigned to a variable before they are sent. Received messages are assigned to variables, too.
Command combinators are de ned inductively. Let c 1 , c 2 be command terms: c 1 ; c 2 sequential composition: c 1 is followed by c 2 , c 1 + c 2 non-deterministic choice: one possibility i s c hosen and executed, c 1 iteration: c 1 is iterated a non-deterministically chosen nite number of times, c 1 jc 2 parallel composition: c 1 and c 2 are executed concurrently.
The parallel composition di ers from the other command combinators in that it is an operator involving two agents composed in parallel, whereas the others can be combinations of commands of one or several agents. A send and a receive operation from two di erent agents can be synchronised. The two agents communicate by synchronised message passing. On the receiving side, data is assigned to a local name. The following is a parallel composition of two agents:
snd A!B X; rcv AB Y j rcv BA Z; snd B!A fZ 1 Later on, we will also consider cryptographic functionality. Our speci cation language consists of two sublanguages: a command language to express behaviour and a logical part to specify and reason about properties of command executions. The language is based on dynamic logic 4 a logic with a notion of state that makes a command language explicit in the notation. Modalities are indexed by programs, which are built from primitive commands such as send and receive. Logical connectors such as conjunction, disjunction or negation are available. There are also mixed operators the modal operators combining commands and logical constructs, which make the language di erent from classical rst-order logics. We i n troduce a box-and a diamond-operator for safety and liveness properties, respectively. Let c be a command.
c : whenever c terminates, it must do so in a state satisfying . hci : it is possible to execute c and terminate in a state satisfying .
If c is a simple state transition, e.g. a receive operation, then ! c and ! h ci are contracts for c with a precondition and a postcondition 2 . I f c snd A!B xjrcv BA y i s a n i n teraction, then x ! snd A!B xjrcv BA y y is a contract for the interaction saying that properties x of an output variable x are transferred to y of an input variable y if the interaction takes place.
We can, for example, specify that an agent B remembers a message X that has been received from A, but an intruder I should not be able to access X, Knows A X ! snd A!B X j rcv BA X Knows B X: Knows I X using a predicate Knows. W e might expect from a key exchange service the parallel execution of agents A and B that a shared key is eventually in place. Knowskey i s a n i n variant for the sender of key. This corresponds to the axioms for the non-deterministic choice 3, except that a choice between two commands is interpreted in one structure, whereas the parallel composition is interpreted in two. A, N a , together with another nonce N b created by B itself back t o A again using encryption, but now A's public key K a . Since A has used B's public key, only B can decrypt the message. If A receives its nonce N a , it can be sure that it has communicated with B. In order to allow B to also verify the authenticity of A, A sends the nonce N b produced by B back t o B. T w o results should be achieved: authenticity of the participants and con dentiality of the nonces.
The Needham-Schroeder Protocol Speci cation
We reformulate the informal protocol speci cation using our command language, before specifying properties. The speci cation shall be divided into ac- The authenticity of the agents A and B and the con dentiality the nonces is not guaranteed here. Encryption to be added later will achieve this.
Properties of the Needham-Schroeder Protocol
A dynamic logic speci cation consists of command terms and properties that specify the commands in their behaviour. We can classify security properties into authentication: authenticity of agents is guaranteed, con dentiality: secret data remains secret, and integrity: data remains intact. We use di erent forms of constraints to address them: Firstly, a n access control constraint describes that a data item is accessible for the receiver, e.g., that data actually arrives if it is sent. This allows us to deal with con dentiality and integrity. An authentication constraint describes that after a sequence of message exchanges one agent is sure about the identity of another agent. This requires the use of cryptographic methods.
The correctness constraint is a data-speci c consistency condition, e.g., that data, which has been sent, satis es a certain condition. Later, we add cryptographic constraints. If a message has been encrypted with a public key, then the message can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key. Authentication and con dentiality can be achieved using cryptographic methods, but, still, an intruder attack can violate all these properties. Previous assignments are overwritten, otherwise older assignments are remembered. After discussing single protocol steps, we address the full behaviour of a single agent. After nishing their execution sequences both agents shall share a secret, or at least the same two v alues 3 The fact that B also remembers the identity o f A see 10 is not relevant at this stage and therefore neglected.
A should only proceed if this is satis ed expressed using a precondition: 
Re nement and Abstraction
The two main concepts for our interference analysis shall now be introduced. Traditionally, re nement is used to develop a speci cation step by step. Re nement also serves another purpose in our approach. Security analysis intruder integration and interference analysis can also be supported. We use the concept of abstraction the dual of re nement to test for interferences. We will brie y show how to add encryption to a simpli ed protocol speci cation in order to illustrate the transformational development approach based on re nement. The concepts for interference analysis and testing will be applied in Section 4.
Re nement
The re nement relation is essentially de ned based on implication. A specication is a re nement of another if it implies it, i.e., if the re nement pre- We h a ve c hosen to de ne a su cient and necessary condition. An intruder cannot beintroduced using re nement see Section 4 that violates the re nement, but does not a ect the security conditions of the original speci cation. A violation of a re nement should only occur if security speci cations are violated.
We do not constrain the commands c and c 0 in any w ay. This allows a single command to be re ned by a sequence of commands. We could also insert commands into a sequence of commands without violating the re nement condition. The re nement o f commands is here de ned on properties of the state that is reached through command execution. More support for a re nement calculus can be based on an inference system for dynamic logic, see 4 .
To add encryption to the protocol speci cation from Section 2.3 using re nement, we de ne two new functions for encryption and decryption and axiomatise their behaviour. The particular encryption method RSA, Merkle-Hellman, etc. 18 shall not matter. We assume that the encryption scheme is secure, i.e., that there are no principal problems such as mathematical aws. We assume a public key encryption scheme. K A is A's public encryption key and K ,1 A is its private decryption key analogously for B. K A X is the encryption operation and K ,1 A Y the decryption operation 4 . The cryptographic law is:
A K A X = X 19 In order to fully specify cryptographic basics, we w ould need to express that not only can the original message be recovered with the corresponding private key, but also that no other key except the corresponding private key can decrypt the message. For the sake of simplicity, w e h a ve left out properties like this.
Each agent shall know the public keys of the agents it wants to communicate with securely. 
Abstraction and Testing
The parallel composition of agents is the essential combinator for our interference analysis. We can automate the analysis by testing the composition of sequential 4 This notation is not su cient for cryptographic techniques such as signatures. To keep the notation simple for the given protocol form, we h a ve used this simple form.
agent behaviours. Each sequential agent behaviour called a scenario is a test case for a non-sequential, non-deterministic agent speci cation. Agents of our ideal protocol have been de ned in a sequential deterministic way, but we assume a non-deterministic behaviour for the intruder. These scenarios shall be constrained by the abstraction Spec w Scen, i.e., the system speci cation Spec is abstracted by the scenario Scen, or, the speci cation re nes the scenario. We will systematically try to nd intruder scenarios that in composition with the protocol agents violate the re nement relation.
The basic principle of test case generation in the context of the re nement calculus is that test cases abstract contracts 5 For an intruder, we cannot assume sequential or deterministic behaviour, but we will test the system using various sequential intruder scenarios. The rst step shall be to de ne a simple input output test case for a com- An example shall illustrate this proposition. We assume the following de nitions for the conditions , , and : x 0, y = x + 1 , x = 1, and y = 2. Then, the two constraints formulated in the proposition are satis ed and we h a ve a proper test case: the condition ! is satis ed since x = 1 ! x 0, and the condition ^ ! is satis ed since x = 1 y = x + 1 ! y = 2 .
In order to deal with interaction between agents of a protocol, we expand our notion of test cases to interactions between two agents. T C c1jc2 x ; y : = x ! c 1 hxijc 2 y y where x and y are properties of x and y, respectively. Properties of x are transferred to y if the interaction takes place. A test case for parallel compositions requires x and y to have the same type. c 1 jc 2 w T C c1jc2 x ; y , x ! y 25 5 Most of the concepts here are motivated by 19 , but formulated in a di erent semantical framework and extended to parallel composition.
The key construct to test concurrent non-deterministic agents is a scenario, i.e., a sequence of basic commands or interactions of basic commands. We de ne a scenario S for a speci cation as a sequence c 1 ; : : : ; c n of basic commands or interactions of basic commands. We assume an iterative non-deterministic choice to be the basic format of an intruder speci cation, see also 31. Scenarios 
Authentication Analysis
A central PKI service is authentication support through certi cates. Therefore, our rst analysis addresses a protocol implementing an authentication service. Security analysis is mostly concerned with safety properties, i.e., something bad must never happen e.g., that the intruder knows a secret at any time, whereas the development of protocols is more involved with liveness properties, i.e., that something good will happen eventually data arrives, keys are eventually in place. Our dynamic logic provides constructs for both aspects.
We will base our analysis on an accepted and successful methodology used by most analysis techniques 8, 20, 21 : formal speci cation of the ideal behaviour, add the intruder or possible interfering features, state the properties to be guaranteed analysed, analyse the ideal speci cation, and vary parameters and analyse again. This justi es to use re nement to add the adversary or new features, but also to vary parameters through repeated use of re nement.
The Protocol
The full speci cation of the desired behaviour of the Needham-Schroeder pro- This is an adaptation of Goguen and Meseguer's classical non-interference denition. Here, an intruder does not interfere with another group of agents, if the excution of intruder commands has no e ect on the agent's security properties.
The Adversary
We assume intruders to have capabilities as formulated in the Dolev-Yao model 22 . The Dolev-Yao model is an accepted collection of assumptions about possible intruder behaviour. The intruder can read any message, block further transmission, decompose messages, remember messages, generate fresh data, and compose and send new messages 6 . In principle, the intruder can non-deterministically choose between these operations. The general di culty with these analyses is to make the right assumptions about the intruder or about new features in feature interaction analysis in order to detect possible interferences. This problem can only be solved by the developer or analyser, but the speci cation and analysis technique should provide the possibility t o v ary assumptions explicitly. The mechanism for an intruder to attack a protocol is to intercept the communication between the agents participating in the protocol. This can be modelled by allowing the intruder to be executed in parallel with the agents. Then, the intruder I can communicate with the agents A and B, receiving and sending messages. Let A := snd A!B y, B := rcv BA y and I := rcv IA y; snd I!B fy. The parallel composition of A, B and intruder I, AjBjI, can result in one of the following executions based on synchronisations of non-deterministically chosen send-and receive-operations. A and B can communicate directly by transferring data from A to B, o r A communicates rst with I and then I communicates with B sending manipulated data fy t o B. The rst is the desired case, the second is a successful intrusion, or interference, using a man-in-the-middle attack. 6 This does not include the intruder's encryption capabilities.
Reducing the capabilities of the intruder to two operations here, the general behaviour of an intruder is: The intruder chooses repeatedly and non-deterministically between sending and receiving we cannot make many assumptions about an intruder's behaviour.
We assume that the intruder does not block communication between A and B.
The Analysis
In a concrete example, the intruder may execute the following command sequence rcv IA returned. This is where the protocol fails to work securelyfootnoteThis attack has originally been described in 23 .. The intruder can be integrated via re nement. The ideal protocol speci cation, which speci es the expected secure behaviour, should be preserved. The inclusion of a successful intruder would violate the ideal speci cation, i.e., would not re ne the ideal protocol speci cation. For instance, the con dentiality constraint could be violated by the intruder behaviour. Re nement is the tool to analyse, i.e., to prove or disprove, the security of a protocol. We w ould hope to prove that all possible extensions by intruder behaviours are re nements that preserve the properties speci ed for the protocol. Then, the protocol is secure.
The essential properties have already been discussed. Eventually the agents A and B have authenticated each other: Auth A B^Auth B A. Including the intruder I as speci ed above in formula 32 will satisfy hAjBjIi Auth A I^Auth B A 33 since the intruder intercepts the communication and is able to imposture as A for B, but this clearly violates the protocol speci cation 30 hAjBjIi Auth A BÂ uth B A which requires that A and B mutually authenticate each other. Seen as a re nement step, we get a violation of the constraint: the predicate Auth A I does obviously not imply Auth A B. Besides being used for the stepwise development, re nement is also a tool for analysis even though our aim now i s t o violate the re nement constraint in order to detect security a ws.
Testing
The testing concepts shall now be applied to the authentication analysis of the Needham-Schroeder protocol. The inclusion of the intruder does not satisfy the constraint that A and B mutually authenticate each other, see 30. A security a w is detected.
Con dentiality and Integrity Analysis
Besides authentication support, a PKI also provides services concerned with the secure distribution of keys and other secrets. In order to show the versatility o f our method, we shall look at con dentiality and integrity issues relating to a key establishment service based on a simpli ed Di e-Hellman protocol 18 .
The Protocol
The protocol assumes a common numberg. 44 We w ant to prevent that an intruder will ever get hold on the secret a safety condition and that A and B will eventually share a secret a liveness condition.
The Adversary
We reduce the capabilities of the intruder to the send-and receive-operations: 
The Analysis
The intruder is again integrated via re nement. A successful intruder inclusion would violate the security conditions of the ideal speci cation, i.e., would not re ne the ideal protocol speci cation. We hope that eventually secrets a and b are in place and nobody else knows about them, i. their approach and our framework. We believe that a formal speci cation framework closer to techniques such as pre postconditions and re nement is more suitable for a general approach to dependable systems engineering. Common characteristics include the aim to reduce implicit assumptions and to make them explicit, and the use of the explicit intruder method.
The spi-calculus 20 is based on the -calculus and includes additional cryptographic primitives. Process calculi such as the -calculus are suitable to model and develop infrastructures for distributed and mobile systems. The key di erence to our approach is that the intruder behaviour is not modelled explicitly in the spi-calculus. Security properties of process de nitions such as con dentiality secrecy and authentication essentially integrity are expressed via equivalences to a process speci cation. Consider the following example. Two processes shall be de ned: a process A sending a message M on channel c AB and a process B := c AB x:F x receiving on c AB and then processing the input x. The protocol is the parallel composition of A and B, i.e., P = c AB :AMjB with a channel c AB restricted to A and B. W e expect B to process M internally, which can be expressed by B spec := c AB x:F M. The overall protocol speci cation is P spec := c AB :AMjB spec .
Secrecy Authentication integrity: PM ' P spec M for all M. The protocol P should behave under observation like its speci cation P spec , i.e., if M is sent, then M arrives unchanged and is processed subsequently. The equivalence ' is testing equivalence. It formalises the idea of observation by a n i n truder. Compared to our approach, the spi-calculus is more abstract. It assumes restricted channels to be secure. Our approach d o e s n o t make this assumption. We o er the possibility of more ne-granular and explicit analyses.
Paulson's Inductive Method 21 uses induction over protocol traces a trace is a list of events that occur in some run of a protocol. Paulson introduces a specialised notation for security protocols. Standard operators to construct, deconstruct and remember messages are used in the speci cation of traces. The overall set of traces describing a protocol is de ned inductively. Focardi, Ghelli and Gorrieri 24 apply a non-interference approach for the analysis of the Needham-Schroeder protocol. To k eep our approach suitable for all forms of dependability aspects and integrated development and analysis, we h a ve included security-speci c aspects into a general-purpose framework, providing exibility and con gurability b y combining di erent command features.
Butler 25 describes an approach to security systems analysis similar to ours. Butler bases his framework on a combination of the abstract machine notation AMN the B method and CSP. He also uses re nement to introduce the intruder. The correctness of an abstraction invariant AI needs to be checked: S v AI T if AI T hSiAI. Butler's approach is based on iterative re nement, i.e., an initial abstraction might need to be strengthened iteratively until suitable. Butler's and our approach are similar in that both use an explicit intruder model and use re nement t o i n troduce encryption and the intruder. Both provide safety and liveness operators and make parallel composition available. The key di erence is that Butler's approach is based on data re nement with explicit state, whereas we use an implicit, observation-based notion of state, which creates a more abstract framework. We think that developing our re nements results into re nement laws giving templates for e.g. con dentiality-preserving re nements is a more suitable way. The combination of CSP and FDR, a model checking tool, has been been very fruitful for security analyses, e.g., to detect Lowe's attack 23 . This work has been carried further; 26 is a recent example. However, a proof-theoretic approach can give more insight i n to why a protocol works or fails than model checking.
We see re nement a s a n i n terference analysis tool, not restricted to security analysis, but also suitable for other forms of interference detection. Feature interaction in telephony systems poses a similar problem 14, 1 5 . If a new feature has to be added to an existing system, the main question is whether there are unexpected or undesirable interferences with existing features. Re nement can answer this question. The principle of our analysis method state the ideal properties, add new behaviour, and analyse possible interferences is not limited to security analysis. In 15 , an investigation into common simple telephone systems and advanced features such as call waiting and call forwarding is carried out. Certain properties invariants are proven for the speci cation of the basic system. A re ned speci cation including advanced features needs to preserve the properties. There is an interference, if this is not possible. Feature interaction is de ned as the violation of proof obligations in a re nement.
Our work is based on testing approaches developed in 27, 28, 29, 19 . We have in particular based parts of our test case generation on ideas developed by Aichernig in 19 . He presented his work in a general purpose context, with semantics based on weakest preconditions essentially based on 3 . We have improved this semantic framework towards a more exible and expressive modal logic framework. Additionally, we have provided an improved, process-algebra style command language including an explicit parallel composition.
Conclusions
Our approach t o i n tegrated development and analysis of dependable systems is based on a re nement mechanism for both purposes. Using re nement as an analysis tool is not restricted to security analyses where various intruder behaviours can be analysed. The analysis of any kind of interference such as feature interaction can be carried out. An essential technique for the analysis of interferences is to vary the behaviour. Elements have to be added or removed in a exible way. We h a ve provided two w ays to control this exibility: rstly, b y using re nement to add new elements while preserving properties, and, secondly, b y providing a framework where the command language for the communication primitives itself is not xed, but can be in uenced through the introduction and axiomatisation of new commands or variants of existing ones. This exibility in re ecting different assumptions about the underlying technology and the intruder is crucial. Another key element is the compositionality of the approach, which supports the required exibility in modelling and analysing various scenarios through composition and decomposition.
Our main objective has been to illustrate the concepts needed to address reliability and security problems in dependable systems engineering. Two di erent aspects have been looked at to show the versatility of the approach. Here, we have illustrated concepts using aspects from the well-known security protocols Needham-Schroeder and Di e-Hellman. In 30 , we have investigated a specialised protocol the Online Certi cate Status Protocol OCSP. Due to the compositionality of the dynamic logic framework, the approach is scalable and can be applied to larger systems. We h a ve addressed mechanised analysis support through test case generation, necessary for large systems analysis. An approach to further simplify reasoning, and enable automated or mechanised reasoning in particular, is to reduce the complexity to equational reasoning by de ning a re nement b e t ween modal formulas where the condition can be reduced to an implication between simple non-modal formulas. Suitable environments for proof support could be tools supporting pre-and postcondition based speci cation or tools such as tools for the B speci cation language, which h a ve also been used in 25 and in the feature interaction analysis 15 discussed earlier on.
We have used abstraction-based testing to verify security properties. Since we h a ve used a dynamic logic similar to the modal -calculus 31 , the question arises whether model checking is another alternative. The modal -calculus is a branching time temporal logic that forms the basis of several model checking approaches, see 32 . With a nite state space and nite set of properties, model checking becomes an alternative. If a given model satis es the ideal protocol speci cation, then the model also has to satisfy the protocol with intruder. Otherwise, there is a security violation. In 30 , we h a ve given semantics to a similar speci cation notation based on Kripke transition systems and the -calculus, enabling model checking as an alternative approach to the automation of the security analysis.
